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The education system, demography and 
unintended consequences 
GERALDINE MCDONALD 
Abstract 
A major feature of the past year has been public discussion about 
education. The solution to problems in the outcomes of schooling have 
almost invariably been seen in the processes of teaching and learning. 
There has been little discussion of the education system itself. 
Examples are provided of effects which are education system related 
but independent of teaching. 
Introduction 
The PISA study reveals that at age 15 there is a “long tail” 
comprising a high proportion of young people whose educational 
attainment falls well below the median. Average attainment scores 
are strong relative to other countries but far too many young people, 
especially Māori and Pacific Island peoples, are left behind with 
adverse human and economic circumstances. (Boven, 2010, p. 2) 
his information came from the results of an international test 
called the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and news of the tail has been reported 
many times together with a determination to fix it. Stimulated by the 
Government’s introduction of national standards and the attempt to 
increase class size, a major feature of the past year has been public 
discussion of education. The long tail has caused anxiety, and there is 
doubt that the traditional link between educational qualifications and 
employment is as strong as it once was. 
The solutions suggested for poor academic performance have 
almost invariably related to teaching and learning, often 
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recommending practices which follow a tutoring model such as 
feedback and feed forward. The debate on how to improve education 
has rarely extended beyond stating the need for single factors such as 
“improved teacher quality” and “standards”. Apart from a formula 
such as, “the education system is failing boys (or Māori)”, the 
education system itself has been overlooked as a factor in the 
outcomes of education and in understanding it as evidence for 
educational outcomes. Yet a change in the education system seldom 
has only one effect.  
Education systems 
There are system issues which go beyond policies determining the 
movement of cohorts from class to class and although education 
systems share features common to all on other characteristics, they 
may differ.  
The mysterious rise in IQ has led to what IQ tests really measure. 
IQ tests arose because of the problems of universal education. It was 
believed at the time that standardised tests tapped hereditary forces 
and maturation and hence the correct way of assessing ability was to 
use chronological age as the standard. Cahan and Cohen (1989) 
published the results of a study based on 12,000 pupils in the Hebrew 
language school system of Jerusalem. The authors wanted to find out 
whether IQ test items were more strongly influenced by age than by 
schooling. They used a technique called a regression discontinuity 
design in which a year of schooling was measured by comparing the 
performance of pupils on both sides of the cut-off point for promotion 
to the next class. There would be a difference in schooling of one year 
between them. The authors found that although there was variation 
according to type of test item, schooling contributed more than age on 
all test items and for some items schooling contributed twice as much 
as age.  
Martin, Mullis and Foy (2011), the IEA PIRLS team, wanted to 
use the Cahan and Cohen regression continuity technique with the 
PIRLS 2006 data. However, the technique needs scores from pupils in 
two adjacent classes and although Norway and Iceland entered a 
Grade 5 class, other countries supplied information for Grade 4 only.  
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In their analysis of the characteristics of the education systems 
which were part of the PIRLS testing, the authors state that it is 
difficult to determine a straightforward relationship between age-
within-grade and achievement across countries and that older students 
do not necessarily perform better. There was great variation in the 
education systems in the PIRLS study regarding age of entry to 
school, method of entry, and whether, once in school, pupils move 
automatically from grade to grade or whether some pupils are delayed. 
From the education systems which took part in PIRLS 2006 the 
authors identified two major ways of organising an education system. 
In the first, children enter on a fixed date and then progress 
automatically year by year. Three systems of this type were identified: 
Iceland, Norway and England. Three other systems were identified in 
which “the combined effect of entry and promotion and retention 
practices is that of producing a predominant age cohort with uniform 
reading achievement, together with an older group with lower 
achievement and a (smaller) younger group with higher achievement” 
(Martin et al., 2011, p. 25). The countries selected to represent this 
pattern were Germany, the United States and Austria. New Zealand 
has the characteristics of this second group. As age increases month 
by month within the year group systems of this second type produce a 
flat line of achievement by Grade 4.  Marion de Lemos (1989), 
working in Australia on standardising tests, had come to a similar 
conclusion for the systems in her country. In the education systems in 
which pupils proceed automatically there is an achievement slope 
from youngest to oldest, a pattern familiar from studies concerned 
with the effect of birthdates. 
I became very interested in education systems and why they 
differed. I had access to scores from TIMSS but there were no general 
statistics for England which made any conclusions somewhat 
tentative. However, or New Zealand I demonstrated the flat line 
described by Martin et al. (2011) for systems that allow retention 
(McDonald, 2001) and I showed the pattern of retention and 
acceleration according to month at age 10.  
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Unintended consequences 
Between 1932 and 1935 5-year-olds were excluded from New 
Zealand schools as a cost-cutting measure. As a consequence, some 
children entered at 6 years, spent one or part of a year in the Primers 
and then proceeded to the Standards. Others also entered at 6 but spent 
two years or more in the Primers. The annual reports to Parliament 
show that the median ages of both girls and boys began to rise. 
Children were becoming older for class level. By 1936 the median age 
in Standard IV was 11.5 months for boys and 11.2 for girls. By 1938 
the median ages at Standard IV had increased to 11.8 and 11.5 and 
there they remained until 1941 when median ages at Standard IV fell 
to 11.6 and 11.4, the point where they had been 10 years earlier. There 
had been a substantial increase in the number of children delayed in 
their progress through school. When our Treasury discussed the policy 
of increasing class size, a policy which was subsequently abandoned, 
were they aware of the number of children whose progress would 
have been delayed as class size expanded?  
It seemed to me that education systems were poorly understood and 
that this led to unrealistic assumptions about educational causes and 
effects. Teachers do not control education systems. When teachers 
became organised, they were able to present the case for smaller classes 
but as teachers they cannot determine the shape of the system, or the 
regulations controlling the progress of children up the ladder of 
schooling. Student flows, for example, are determined by conditions 
such as population pressure, regulations on class size, ratio of teachers 
to pupils, and room in the next class (Frederiksen, 1983). Teachers 
work within this system. On the other hand, the system may work 
against the achievement gains which can be attributed to teaching. 
Education systems are not simple, and the remainder of this account 
consists of descriptions of aspects of education which are not the 
consequence of teaching; rather, they are features related in varying 
ways to age in grade (class level) patterns. When education systems are 
stable it probably matters little if no-one knows how the system 
operates but once changes are introduced it is desirable to have such 
knowledge and know whether there might be unintended consequences. 
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The birthdate as a system effect  
There is a longstanding belief that the season of the year in which one 
is born, or the month of birth, affects intelligence and ability to learn. 
There have been numerous explanations for why groups of children 
born in particular months have lower average achievement scores than 
children with different birthdates. Although the problem of the 
“summer born” has been associated particularly with the education 
system of England, the issue has been identified in a range of OECD 
countries (Bedard & Dhuey, 2006) and the popularity of the topic can 
be seen in a recent review of research papers on the subject published 
since 1990 (Sykes, Bell, & Rodeiro, 2009). 
Tests of the intelligence of school children, which could be 
answered on paper, were developed in the 1920s by a team who had 
first developed tests for entrants to the United States army during the 
First World War. These self-administered tests spread rapidly to other 
countries including New Zealand. Season of birth effects had earlier 
been sought in physical capacity such as strength and growth. 
Intellectual effects had been restricted to matters such as establishing 
the birthdates of prominent men. The new tests were capable of testing 
large numbers of pupils and opened the way for the study of the 
relationship between date of birth and IQ. Several tests, including Otis 
tests, were used to supply scores.  
Rudolph Pintner, a pioneer in the study of the effect of the seasons, 
was born in England in 1884 but moved to the United States where he 
eventually became a prominent academic at Teachers College 
Columbia University. He was interested in issues to do with disability, 
he developed standardised tests of intelligence and he was a leader in 
the study of the effect of seasons on intellect, believing that winter 
affected what he called “the germ plasm.” He published a paper on the 
subject in 1931 (Pintner, 1931) and with a colleague continued to 
publish on month of birth and its relationship to the IQ and other 
factors such as temperament (Pintner & Forlano, 1933). In their 1933 
paper, the data consisted of 17,502 IQs obtained from 13 different 
tests. 
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Pintner lived in the Northern Hemisphere. Realising that the 
seasons differed according to hemisphere he obtained IQs from 
Australia but these did not show clear-cut results. A.B. Fitt, Professor 
of Education at Auckland University College, gained access to scores 
from the Otis test which was standardised in New Zealand in 1936. He 
could not make winter fit his results and concluded that in the 
Southern Hemisphere autumn was the dangerous time because that 
was when fading light induced processes of hibernation which 
affected the quality of the germ plasm. Fitt used scores which were 
age normed. These did not take account of the class placement of the 
children who had gained the IQs. Because in New Zealand some 
children are kept behind for a further year in the beginning classes, 
generally on the grounds of immaturity, age groups have a different 
composition according to place in the year group. Fitt provides no 
information on the class composition of his seasonal samples but they 
would have had different distributions of age by class level. This 
would have distorted his matching of IQ and time of conception. 
Although they shared the same season of birth they were not all at the 
class levels for their age. Apart from Fitt’s (1941) monograph on the 
topic of seasonal effects, there seems to have been little interest in the 
birthdate in New Zealand until very recently. 
Before it was disbanded, the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority in the UK commissioned the National Foundation for 
Educational Research (NFER) in 2009 under the leadership of 
Caroline Sharp to collect information about relative age effects. The 
report was to be a “Thematic Probe” which explored the existence of 
international effects. As part of this enterprise, information was sought 
from various countries including New Zealand. Ian Schagen, on 
secondment from NFER and attached to the New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, analysed for New Zealand age, position in class, and 
scores for reading from PIRLS 2006 and scores for Mathematics and 
Science from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS, 2006) concluding that birth month had a significant 
effect on New Zealand children’s reading and maths scores with the 
oldest performing best (Sharp, George, Sargent, O’Donnell, & Heron, 
2009). This information needs to be treated with considerable caution. 
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Schagen did not seem to understand the New Zealand system of 
school entry and selective promotion. He claimed that children born in 
February were the youngest in the class and that February children 
performed poorly in Mathematics. This finding reveals not a function 
of relative age. The explanation for difference is more likely to lie in 
the extent to which an age group is complete or incomplete for the 
expected level. Schagen’s frame of reference appears to be one which 
matches the English education system with children of one age all 
moving together. New Zealand does have a cut-off date for promotion. 
It varies from school to school and affects only some children. 
Using the scores from PIRLS 2006 to unravel age distributions and 
reading achievement configurations, Martin et al. (2011) concluded 
that older children do not necessarily have higher achievement than 
younger children. 
PIRLS and TIMSS sample by grade (class level) and not by age 
and a New Zealand class will be a mixture of older children whose 
progress has been delayed as well as those with the same birth date 
but a year younger:  
It is fundamental to recognise that students’ age-within-grade can be 
manipulated by policy decisions and, in particular, that policies on 
age of entry to school and policies on promotion/retention can 
influence not just the average age but also the age distribution within 
a grade. (Martin et al., 2011, p. 13) 
In the first year of schooling in New Zealand children’s ages and 
length of schooling coincide. In the second year children who will 
have been at school for at least 18 months as measured at mid-year are 
eligible for promotion out of the Junior School. However, principals 
may also establish a cut-off date earlier in the year, often in March or 
April, which establishes a group referred to variously as “mid-year-
entrants”, “possibles” or even “doubtfuls”. The younger the child in 
the year group, the greater the chance of being retained (see 
McDonald, 2001, p. 384). The effect of this practice is to spread 
children of one age over three class levels and for there to be 
representatives of three ages in one class. 
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The practice of classification was originally set out in regulations 
and selective promotion was strongly backed by articles in Education, 
the Department of Education’s journal. In 1962 the Commission on 
Education in New Zealand endorsed the practice of delay. It was 
praised as a “flexible” policy. Unfortunately it was flexible at the 
expense of Māori and of boys. Retention was frequent but acceleration 
was rare. Following the introduction of Tomorrow’s Schools, new 
legislation was drafted, and in the Education Act 1989 the regulations 
on classification were omitted. By the time I began to look for 
statistics which would show whether or not children were still being 
retained, the former age by grade tables had been removed from the 
education statistics and in 1994 replaced with what later came to be 
called Funding Year Levels. On entry to the intermediate level of 
schooling the funding year figures were reset to show the age-grade 
position at Year 7. The increased number of students made it appear 
that there was some process of holding back taking place at 
Intermediate and subsequently at Secondary level. The increase 
seemed far more likely to have emerged on exit from the Junior 
School but had not been recorded at the time.  
In 2010 I asked people with knowledge of junior school practice 
whether children were judged as needing another year to mature and 
all confirmed that the process described in the old regulations still 
applied. New Zealand is not the only country to hold children back 
with the best intentions for the child and indeed it does no harm to 
most children but for those from poorer families it increases the 
likelihood that they will drop out of school when they reach leaving 
age and that they will have had no opportunity to gain qualifications. 
Nobody expects this to happen but subsequent efforts to keep students 
in school may be thwarted by a process that occurs on exit from the 
beginning classes. 
The practice of holding children back from entry to school is 
common in some parts of the US on the grounds that the children are 
young and “not ready”. Shepard and Smith (1985, p. 29) have 
commented that “children are much more likely to be ‘unready’ for 
school because their parents have less education than because they are 
‘young’”.  
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Academic redshirting may also affect the relationship of age to 
level. Redshirting has long been practised in the US and more recently 
in Australia and New Zealand. The process applied originally to 
sports. Boys would delay entering formal sport to allow increase in 
growth and skill to improve their chances of selection. In academic 
redshirting those children, generally boys, who are amongst the 
youngest in the year group may be held back in kindergarten or the 
first year of school in order to be the oldest when they are promoted. 
Academic redshirting is intended to increase a boy’s (it is usually a 
boy) chance of being a leader and top of the next class. There is no 
firm agreement whether the practice is helpful to a child but since it is 
confined largely to boys from middle class families it is unlikely to 
end up in early leaving. 
The economists Dhuey and Lipscombe (2008) report that, on the 
assumption that high school leadership is a sign of good genetics or 
family background, it is likely to lead employers to offer positions 
with a good wage. However, they point out that high school leadership 
may arise simply because of a student’s relative age determined by the 
school structure, the oldest in the year group being most likely to 
assume leadership. Probably some have been retained in the beginning 
classes to achieve this result. 
Ethnic and gender differences  
While practices within a single system are more uniform than they are 
across systems, there are variations in age by grade across schools in 
any one system. These may arise because of factors such as population 
pressure on school rolls, and parents’ attitudes to time of entry, When 
it was announced that the proposed increase in class size in New 
Zealand was too small to make a difference, the judgement appears to 
have been related to group achievement. Yet, as the experience in the 
1930s shows, individual children were likely to have been kept back 
to maintain larger class sizes.  
In 1988 the process of repeating a class affected 6- to 7-year-old 
children according to ethnicity and gender. Pākehā girls had the 
greatest chance of being promoted out of the Junior School, Pākehā 
boys the next greatest chance, Māori girls were next, and Māori boys 
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came last (McDonald, 1988). Although the Ministry of Education 
does not publish the relationship between chronological age and year 
level, it does publish statistics relating to gender and ethnicity and the 
number in each category attending school each year. Education 
Counts records figures for Pākehā girls, Pākehā boys, Māori girls and 
Māori boys, and other smaller ethnic categories. 
The earliest record of attendance by ethnicity appeared in Funding 
Year 1 in July 2004. I then looked at the figures for Pākehā girls and 
boys and Māori girls and boys at 1 July 2010 to see how many of the 
original ethnic cohorts were still at school. See Table 1 for the results. 
Table 1. Retention in school by gender and ethnicity 
Pākehā girls Pākehā boys Māori girls Māori boys 
87% 79% 50% 43% 
Calculations based on figures from Education Counts. 
The order of retention by gender and ethnicity in secondary school 
mirrors the order found in 1988 for exit from the junior school. The 
Pasifika group had stayed in school in proportions almost equal to the 
Pākehā group and no Asian pupils had dropped out. 
Economists and birthdate 
A group of economists (Crawford, Dearden, & Meghir, 2010) 
collected information from every local body in England regarding 
method and age of entry to school. The authors followed the fate of 
cohorts up to their involvement in the workforce concluding that the 
fiscal impact of date of birth can be traced through to employment. 
The authors stressed the importance of the time when children were 
judged. They suggest that young children should not be tested at times 
related to the school year such as halfway through and at the end of 
the school year. Reports to parents would be much fairer, they say, if 
children were tested at the same age to offset the birth date effect. This 
is already done in the Six-Year-Net used to determine whether or not 
New Zealand children would be helped by Reading Recovery.   
There is insufficient evidence of a birth date effect in New Zealand 
to adopt any of the corrections that have been suggested, such as the 
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teacher calling the roll in date and not in alphabetical order to remind 
everyone of the birth date effect, or that age adjusted scores should be 
used. Nevertheless, if children are to be tested for national standards 
in their first year at school and before any promotion decisions, 
thought could be given to testing children not in relation to the school 
year, but according to a standard age. While this is the fairest way to 
judge children, it may not be the best way to judge schools.  
Change in “mental ability” 
The IQ score begins as a raw score or number of correct answers and 
this is compared with the average score of others of the same age in 
years and months. The result is then converted to an IQ which is 
generally a position on the error curve with a mean of 100 and a 
Standard Deviation of 15. For any given raw score, the younger the 
individual, the higher the IQ. Now recall also that Cahan and Cohen 
(1989) had established that class level contributed more to success on 
IQ items than age. Also consider the education system itself. The New 
Zealand system began with standards to be reached before children 
were promoted to the next class and for some time the result was that 
large numbers of children remained in the early classes. This position 
appears to have been universal and many authorities in the United 
States set up investigations to determine the cause (Volkmor & Noble, 
1914). There was not a great deal of change in the relation between 
age and class level until the late 1930s when social promotion began 
to gain favour, secondary education was expanding, and education 
systems lost their collections of children as young as 10 in the Primer 
classes (McDonald, 2010). The last New Zealand standard, 
Proficiency, which gave pupils access to free secondary education, 
was eliminated in 1936. The overall result was that age fell steadily at 
class level.  
The scores from the Otis and other intelligence tests were 
increasingly accepted as an accurate measure of intelligence. United 
States soldiers in World War II tested with the original Army Alpha 
Test were found to have performed better than their World War I 
counterparts (Tuddenham, 1948). Another example of score rise 
occurred in Scotland where a Moray House Test given originally to a 
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complete cohort of 11-year-olds in Scotland in 1932 was given again 
to 70,000 11-year-olds in 1947. There had been a fear that because the 
lower orders had large families and the middle classes did not, the 
national intelligence would have fallen. The national IQ had in fact 
risen by 2 points (Scottish Council for Research in Education, 1949).  
In 1936, Redmond and Davies (1940) collected the figures for a 
New Zealand standardisation of an Otis Intermediate test of Mental 
Ability for pupils in primary and lower secondary school. In 1968, the 
test was re-standardised (Elley, 1969). A comparison of the results 
showed substantial gains. Elley (1969) reported that New Zealand 
children had gained a year of mental age. He suggested that “it it is 
certainly difficult to attribute the gain shown in the study to hereditary 
factors” (p. 153). He explained that the gain over the years amounted 
to half a standard deviation which translates into 7 points of Otis IQ. 
Although Elley attributes possible causes in a tentative fashion, he 
clearly favours educational agencies of varying kinds. There is no 
suggestion in his report that the large gain might have anything to do 
with the demographic structure of the education system and 
particularly the lowering of age for class level and the interaction 
between age in grade and the calculation of the IQ.  
There are at least two ways in which age by grade (class level) 
figures could help to pinpoint an explanation for the rise. In the 32 
years the median ages of boys and girls had steadily fallen at class 
level. Children had become younger and the collection of 10-year-olds 
in classes below Standard 3 had all disappeared by 1968. The 10-year-
old cohort in 1968 was a year younger for schooling level than its 
counterpart in 1936 and so would have gained 7 points of IQ by virtue 
of being one class level higher. 
This is only one way of demonstrating that the rise in IQ was the 
consequence of alteration in the relationship between age and class 
level. The distribution of 10-year-olds across classes in 1936 included 
10-year-olds below Standard 3. The percentage of 10-year-olds at 
each class level were calculated as a basis for a comparison of results 
from the two years. The proportions were then assigned a class norm 
(Redmond & Davies, 1940, p. 113). Below Standard 3, 10-year-olds 
had no class norms and they received a score of zero. The comparison 
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of scores for each of the years 1936 and 1968 showed a difference of 
6.4 points of IQ. The difference between this figure and the 7 points of 
IQ reported by Elley could be attributed to test sophistication but 
much of the mental gain was due to the upward movement of children 
in the beginning classes. 
A dilemma 
As long ago as 1958, Colgan, a high school principal, pointed out that 
the slow rate of progress of pupils through primary school meant that 
boys often did not reach secondary school before they became eligible 
to leave and promptly did so. He pinpointed particularly boys with 
birthdays from March to mid-year as the students most likely to drop 
out. These are the ones most likely to have been retained. Getting 
everyone to stay in secondary school remains a problem which we 
share with other countries.  
However, the delay of some of the youngest on exit from the junior 
classes appears to avoid creating a birth date effect, the condition which 
troubles English pupils. At the same time the practice increases the 
likelihood of early leaving by those kept back. Holding back takes 
place in the second year of schooling and certainly there is no intention 
of doing harm to any pupil. Yet it is the Māori boys who are most 
likely to repeat a year. Efforts to keep Māori boys from dropping out of 
school are at risk of being forestalled by their delay in progress up the 
ladder of schooling. There is no easy answer but there are possibilities. 
Accepting that some pupils do need extra tuition, especially regarding 
literacy, this should be supplied at all levels where pupils need help and 
not be concentrated in the beginning years. Some education systems 
follow this pattern and indeed help of this kind exists in NZ. The issue 
is not about whether teaching would help, but at what point or points in 
the system help should be available. 
Cohorts of pupils should be tracked throughout their schooling to 
detect any patterns of delay which need to be addressed. For many 
years it was possible to carry out such tracking but in 1994 the age by 
grade information was removed. Even with re-setting at Intermediate 
and Secondary levels it is now impossible to use the published 
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statistics to follow any delay in the early years of schooling, its size 
and exactly when it occurs.  
General changes 
As Martin et al. have demonstrated, in all countries with universal 
provision of education the system takes a similar but not identical 
form. This common system used to be held together by “rule-
governed processes, centralised legal frameworks and shared 
assumptions” as underpinning the traditional forms of universal 
systems of education (Ozga, 2009, p. 149). The use of computers has 
greatly increased the ability to collect, analyse and store data. In her 
comments on the English education system today, Ozga argues that 
“the massive growth of data has unbalanced the relations of governing 
and created highly centralised system steering” (p.149). This is 
exactly what is happening in New Zealand too.  
This article has tried to show that the education system has a life of 
its own. It has unintended consequences, produces its own effects on 
children’s achievements and it can counter gains from effective 
teaching. Schools can make their own decisions on aspects of 
promotion/retention. Will league tables based on National Standards 
encourage any schools to hold more pupils back? 
And what about the long tail? As Clark (2012) has pointed out, 
within-school solutions are likely to be ineffective in reducing an 
inequality which arises outside the education system.  
Conclusion 
I have outlined aspects of the New Zealand education system which 
are not the result of teaching and, particularly, those features which 
may have unintended consequences or which appear to be poorly 
understood. The analysis by the PIRLS team provides a new way of 
looking at education systems. One kind of system admits children on a 
fixed date and moves them up automatically year by year and another, 
like our own, allows retention and acceleration in the early years and 
which does not produce a birthdate slope. Knowledge about changes 
over time in the patterns of age by grade together with how IQ tests 
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are scored provide a key to the explanation for rising scores. Systems 
are interconnected and the selective promotion of our system is 
connected to whether students stay in school or drop out. It would be 
desirable to follow the flow of students through school but for that to 
happen, age by grade tables would need to be reinstated. 
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